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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-3356 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD CACERES,  
Appellant 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court,  
District of New Jersey  
(Crim. No. 1-11-cr-00798-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Jerome Simandle    
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 6, 2103 
_____________ 
 
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 2, 2013) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
Appellant, Richard Caceres, alleges that the District Court for the District of New 
Jersey substantively and procedurally erred when it sentenced him to a 151-month prison 
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term for distribution of and possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only the facts and 
procedural history relevant to our disposition of this case.
1
 At the time of his arrest for the 
present charge, Caceres was on parole and supervised release from two previous 
convictions for drug related offenses. Specifically, Caceres had been convicted of a 2001 
cocaine distribution charge within 1,000 feet of a school and of 2005 charges of 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin and 
possession of a firearm in furtherance of the offense. After serving time for both offenses, 
Caceres was deported to the Dominican Republic. However, in 2010, he unlawfully 
reentered the country and was arrested later that year for the crimes at issue in this 
appeal. 
Caceres was charged in a one-count indictment with distributing and possessing 
with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). 
He pled guilty to the charge on March 30, 2012. Due to his prior criminal history, 
Caceres was classified as a career offender. With a resulting offense level of 29 and 
criminal history category of VI, Caceres’s Guideline range was 151 to 188 months’ 
imprisonment. Without the repeat offender categorization, the applicable guideline range 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
over the District Court’s Order of Judgment and conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We have jurisdiction to review Caceres’s sentence for reasonableness. United States v. 
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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would have been 57 to 71 months. At sentencing, Caceres moved to depart downward 
from the career offender range, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b), arguing that his criminal 
history was overstated. He also sought a downward departure based on his extraordinary 
responsibilities for his children in the United States and for his sick father in the 
Dominican Republic. The District Court denied his motion and, after considering the 
relevant factors under § 3553(a), sentenced him to the bottom of the advisory range—151 
months in prison.   
II. 
 On appeal, Caceres contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion 
for a downward departure, failing to adequately address the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, 
and improperly referencing his unlawful reentry into the country.  
 First, Caceres argues that the District Court should have granted his motion for a 
downward departure because his criminal history category overstated the seriousness of 
his crimes and his likelihood of recidivism, and because he had extraordinary family 
responsibilities. However, we are without jurisdiction to review a district court’s 
discretionary decision to deny a motion to depart, so long as the district court’s refusal to 
depart is not based on a “mistaken belief that it lacks discretion to do otherwise.” United 
States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 103 (3d Cir. 2007). Caceres concedes that the District 
Court “recognized . . . [it] could depart downward,” Appellant’s Br. at 5, and, based on 
our review of the record, we agree. In addressing Caceres’s arguments, the Court found 
that Caceres’s criminal history was not overstated because he was a “recidivist” whose 
previous convictions were for “significant” crimes. App. BA64-65. It also found that his 
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family responsibilities were not extraordinary enough to warrant a departure because “if 
Mr. Caceres is in prison the children will still survive” and “whatever his father’s needs 
may be, it’s not Mr. Caceres who is depended upon to fulfill them.” App. BA68. Because 
the District Court acknowledged that “a downward departure may be warranted” in some 
cases, App. BA63, but chose not to depart here based on the foregoing circumstances, we 
may not disturb its decision.  
 Next, Caceres contends that the District Court failed to adequately weigh the 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Specifically, he argues that the District Court 
should have considered the disparity between his sentence and those of his co-defendants, 
which ranged from 37 to 80 months in prison. District courts must give “meaningful 
consideration to the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d 
Cir. 2006). However, the court need not state or even address all of the § 3553(a) factors. 
United States v. Charles, 467 F.3d 828, 831 (3d Cir. 2006). We review a sentence to 
determine whether the District Court reasonably applied the § 3553(a) factors to the case. 
Cooper, 437 F.3d at 330.   
 Here, the Court extensively discussed numerous sentencing factors, including 
deterrence and the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the crime 
and promote respect for the law. Furthermore, contrary to Caceres’s contentions, the 
District Court did in fact consider the “need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 
18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(6). After discussing the sentence imposed on one of Caceres’s co-
defendants, the Court explained, “even though the quantities for which the two were held 
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are not that different, the resulting sentences are because of [Caceres’s] career offender 
status and the . . . incorrigibility of Mr. Caceres.” App. BA42. It is clear from the record 
that the District Court gave meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors and 
reasonably applied them to the facts of this case. 
 Finally, Caceres contends that the District Court improperly and repeatedly 
referenced his unlawful reentry in determining his sentence. We disagree. Reentry after 
deportation is a violation of the law, one which, along with Caceres’s other crimes, could 
support an increased sentence, and is relevant to the history and character of the 
defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Caceres’s argument that his sentence signals to 
other courts that greater sentences can be imposed on illegal immigrants is unavailing. 
The District Court was clear that it was focusing on his illegal activity rather than his 
immigration status in imposing a sentence. In fact, Caceres received a sentence at the 
bottom of the Guideline range. Caceres’s arguments are thus exaggerated. It is evident 
that Caceres’s sentence was “premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of 
the relevant factors.” United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 204 (3d Cir. 2007). 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
